security: improve path validation and git command safety

Enhance input validation for documentation fetcher constructor and replace
shell command execution with safer alternatives using argument arrays.

Changes:
- Add comprehensive path validation with sanitization
- Replace execSync with spawnSync using argument arrays
- Add HTTPS-only validation for repository URLs
- Extend security test coverage

Version: 2.18.6 → 2.18.7

Thanks to @ErbaZZ for responsible disclosure.

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
czlonkowski
2025-10-11 17:05:16 +02:00
parent 29b2b1d4c1
commit a94ff0586c
4 changed files with 206 additions and 14 deletions

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
import path from 'path';
import { logger } from './logger';
import { execSync } from 'child_process';
import { spawnSync } from 'child_process';
// Enhanced documentation structure with rich content
export interface EnhancedNodeDocumentation {
@@ -61,36 +61,136 @@ export interface DocumentationMetadata {
export class EnhancedDocumentationFetcher {
private docsPath: string;
private docsRepoUrl = 'https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n-docs.git';
private readonly docsRepoUrl = 'https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n-docs.git';
private cloned = false;
constructor(docsPath?: string) {
this.docsPath = docsPath || path.join(__dirname, '../../temp', 'n8n-docs');
// SECURITY: Validate and sanitize docsPath to prevent command injection
// See: https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/issues/265 (CRITICAL-01 Part 2)
const defaultPath = path.join(__dirname, '../../temp', 'n8n-docs');
if (!docsPath) {
this.docsPath = defaultPath;
} else {
// SECURITY: Block directory traversal and malicious paths
const sanitized = this.sanitizePath(docsPath);
if (!sanitized) {
logger.error('Invalid docsPath rejected in constructor', { docsPath });
throw new Error('Invalid docsPath: path contains disallowed characters or patterns');
}
// SECURITY: Verify path is absolute and within allowed boundaries
const absolutePath = path.resolve(sanitized);
// Block paths that could escape to sensitive directories
if (absolutePath.startsWith('/etc') ||
absolutePath.startsWith('/sys') ||
absolutePath.startsWith('/proc') ||
absolutePath.startsWith('/var/log')) {
logger.error('docsPath points to system directory - blocked', { docsPath, absolutePath });
throw new Error('Invalid docsPath: cannot use system directories');
}
this.docsPath = absolutePath;
logger.info('docsPath validated and set', { docsPath: this.docsPath });
}
// SECURITY: Validate repository URL is HTTPS
if (!this.docsRepoUrl.startsWith('https://')) {
logger.error('docsRepoUrl must use HTTPS protocol', { url: this.docsRepoUrl });
throw new Error('Invalid repository URL: must use HTTPS protocol');
}
}
/**
* Sanitize path input to prevent command injection and directory traversal
* SECURITY: Part of fix for command injection vulnerability
*/
private sanitizePath(inputPath: string): string | null {
// SECURITY: Reject paths containing any shell metacharacters or control characters
// This prevents command injection even before attempting to sanitize
const dangerousChars = /[;&|`$(){}[\]<>'"\\#\n\r\t]/;
if (dangerousChars.test(inputPath)) {
logger.warn('Path contains shell metacharacters - rejected', { path: inputPath });
return null;
}
// Block directory traversal attempts
if (inputPath.includes('..') || inputPath.startsWith('.')) {
logger.warn('Path traversal attempt blocked', { path: inputPath });
return null;
}
return inputPath;
}
/**
* Clone or update the n8n-docs repository
* SECURITY: Uses spawnSync with argument arrays to prevent command injection
* See: https://github.com/czlonkowski/n8n-mcp/issues/265 (CRITICAL-01 Part 2)
*/
async ensureDocsRepository(): Promise<void> {
try {
const exists = await fs.access(this.docsPath).then(() => true).catch(() => false);
if (!exists) {
logger.info('Cloning n8n-docs repository...');
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(this.docsPath), { recursive: true });
execSync(`git clone --depth 1 ${this.docsRepoUrl} ${this.docsPath}`, {
stdio: 'pipe'
logger.info('Cloning n8n-docs repository...', {
url: this.docsRepoUrl,
path: this.docsPath
});
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(this.docsPath), { recursive: true });
// SECURITY: Use spawnSync with argument array instead of string interpolation
// This prevents command injection even if docsPath or docsRepoUrl are compromised
const cloneResult = spawnSync('git', [
'clone',
'--depth', '1',
this.docsRepoUrl,
this.docsPath
], {
stdio: 'pipe',
encoding: 'utf-8'
});
if (cloneResult.status !== 0) {
const error = cloneResult.stderr || cloneResult.error?.message || 'Unknown error';
logger.error('Git clone failed', {
status: cloneResult.status,
stderr: error,
url: this.docsRepoUrl,
path: this.docsPath
});
throw new Error(`Git clone failed: ${error}`);
}
logger.info('n8n-docs repository cloned successfully');
} else {
logger.info('Updating n8n-docs repository...');
execSync('git pull --ff-only', {
logger.info('Updating n8n-docs repository...', { path: this.docsPath });
// SECURITY: Use spawnSync with argument array and cwd option
const pullResult = spawnSync('git', [
'pull',
'--ff-only'
], {
cwd: this.docsPath,
stdio: 'pipe'
stdio: 'pipe',
encoding: 'utf-8'
});
if (pullResult.status !== 0) {
const error = pullResult.stderr || pullResult.error?.message || 'Unknown error';
logger.error('Git pull failed', {
status: pullResult.status,
stderr: error,
cwd: this.docsPath
});
throw new Error(`Git pull failed: ${error}`);
}
logger.info('n8n-docs repository updated');
}
this.cloned = true;
} catch (error) {
logger.error('Failed to clone/update n8n-docs repository:', error);