fix: enforce ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY path validation across all routes

This fixes a critical security issue where path parameters from client requests
were not validated against ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY, allowing attackers to access
files and directories outside the configured root directory.

Changes:
- Add validatePath() checks to 29 route handlers that accept path parameters
- Validate paths in agent routes (workingDirectory, imagePaths)
- Validate paths in feature routes (projectPath)
- Validate paths in worktree routes (projectPath, worktreePath)
- Validate paths in git routes (projectPath, filePath)
- Validate paths in auto-mode routes (projectPath, worktreePath)
- Validate paths in settings/suggestions routes (projectPath)
- Return 403 Forbidden for paths outside ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY
- Maintain backward compatibility (unrestricted when env var not set)

Security Impact:
- Prevents directory traversal attacks
- Prevents unauthorized file access
- Prevents arbitrary code execution via unvalidated paths

All validation follows the existing pattern in fs routes and session creation,
using the validatePath() function from lib/security.ts which checks against
both ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY and DATA_DIR (appData).

Tests: All 653 unit tests passing

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Test User
2025-12-20 18:13:34 -05:00
parent 873429db19
commit ade80484bb
30 changed files with 449 additions and 10 deletions

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
import type { Request, Response } from "express";
import { getErrorMessage, logError } from "../common.js";
import { getGitRepositoryDiffs } from "../../common.js";
import { validatePath, PathNotAllowedError } from "../../../lib/security.js";
export function createDiffsHandler() {
return async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -16,6 +17,20 @@ export function createDiffsHandler() {
return;
}
// Validate paths are within ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY
try {
validatePath(projectPath);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof PathNotAllowedError) {
res.status(403).json({
success: false,
error: error.message,
});
return;
}
throw error;
}
try {
const result = await getGitRepositoryDiffs(projectPath);
res.json({

View File

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import { exec } from "child_process";
import { promisify } from "util";
import { getErrorMessage, logError } from "../common.js";
import { generateSyntheticDiffForNewFile } from "../../common.js";
import { validatePath, PathNotAllowedError } from "../../../lib/security.js";
const execAsync = promisify(exec);
@@ -25,6 +26,21 @@ export function createFileDiffHandler() {
return;
}
// Validate paths are within ALLOWED_ROOT_DIRECTORY
try {
validatePath(projectPath);
validatePath(filePath);
} catch (error) {
if (error instanceof PathNotAllowedError) {
res.status(403).json({
success: false,
error: error.message,
});
return;
}
throw error;
}
try {
// First check if the file is untracked
const { stdout: status } = await execAsync(