chore: remove unused files from codebase

This commit is contained in:
Kacper
2025-12-31 03:22:25 +01:00
parent 847a8ff327
commit 944e2f5ffe
4 changed files with 0 additions and 2081 deletions

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
# API Security Hardening Design
**Date:** 2025-12-29
**Branch:** protect-api-with-api-key
**Status:** Approved
## Overview
Security improvements for the API authentication system before merging the PR. These changes harden the existing implementation for production deployment scenarios (local, Docker, internet-exposed).
## Fixes to Implement
### 1. Use Short-Lived wsToken for WebSocket Authentication
**Problem:** The client currently passes `sessionToken` in WebSocket URL query parameters. Query params get logged and can leak credentials.
**Solution:** Update the client to:
1. Fetch a wsToken from `/api/auth/token` before each WebSocket connection
2. Use `wsToken` query param instead of `sessionToken`
3. Never put session tokens in URLs
**Files to modify:**
- `apps/ui/src/lib/http-api-client.ts` - Update `connectWebSocket()` to fetch wsToken first
---
### 2. Add Environment Variable to Hide API Key from Logs
**Problem:** The API key is printed to console on startup, which gets captured by logging systems in production.
**Solution:** Add `AUTOMAKER_HIDE_API_KEY=true` env var to suppress the banner.
**Files to modify:**
- `apps/server/src/lib/auth.ts` - Wrap console.log banner in env var check
---
### 3. Add Rate Limiting to Login Endpoint
**Problem:** No brute force protection on `/api/auth/login`. Attackers could attempt many API keys.
**Solution:** Add basic in-memory rate limiting:
- ~5 attempts per minute per IP
- In-memory Map tracking (resets on server restart)
- Return 429 Too Many Requests when exceeded
**Files to modify:**
- `apps/server/src/routes/auth/index.ts` - Add rate limiting logic to login handler
---
### 4. Use Timing-Safe Comparison for API Key
**Problem:** Using `===` for API key comparison is vulnerable to timing attacks.
**Solution:** Use `crypto.timingSafeEqual()` for constant-time comparison.
**Files to modify:**
- `apps/server/src/lib/auth.ts` - Update `validateApiKey()` function
---
### 5. Make WebSocket Tokens Single-Use
**Problem:** wsTokens can be reused within the 5-minute window. If intercepted, attackers have time to use them.
**Solution:** Delete the token after first successful validation.
**Files to modify:**
- `apps/server/src/lib/auth.ts` - Update `validateWsConnectionToken()` to delete after use
---
## Implementation Order
1. Fix #4 (timing-safe comparison) - Simple, isolated change
2. Fix #5 (single-use wsToken) - Simple, isolated change
3. Fix #2 (hide API key env var) - Simple, isolated change
4. Fix #3 (rate limiting) - Moderate complexity
5. Fix #1 (client wsToken usage) - Requires coordination with server
## Testing Notes
- Test login with rate limiting (verify 429 after 5 attempts)
- Test WebSocket connection with new wsToken flow
- Test wsToken is invalidated after first use
- Verify `AUTOMAKER_HIDE_API_KEY=true` suppresses banner