security: Fix critical vulnerabilities in worktree init script feature

Fix multiple command injection and security vulnerabilities in the worktree
initialization script system:

**Critical Fixes:**
- Add branch name validation to prevent command injection in create/delete endpoints
- Replace string interpolation with array-based command execution using spawnProcess
- Implement safe environment variable allowlist to prevent credential exposure
- Add script content validation with 1MB size limit and dangerous pattern detection

**Code Quality:**
- Centralize execGitCommand helper in common.ts using @automaker/platform's spawnProcess
- Remove duplicate isGitRepo implementation, standardize imports to @automaker/git-utils
- Follow DRY principle by reusing existing platform utilities
- Add comprehensive JSDoc documentation with security examples

This addresses 6 critical/high severity vulnerabilities identified in security audit:
1. Command injection via unsanitized branch names (delete.ts)
2. Command injection via unsanitized branch names (create.ts)
3. Missing branch validation in init script execution
4. Environment variable exposure (ANTHROPIC_API_KEY and other secrets)
5. Path injection via command substitution
6. Arbitrary script execution without content limits

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Shirone
2026-01-11 01:14:07 +01:00
parent 385e7f5c1e
commit 8ed2fa07a0
6 changed files with 165 additions and 52 deletions

View File

@@ -3,15 +3,51 @@
*/
import { createLogger } from '@automaker/utils';
import { spawnProcess } from '@automaker/platform';
import { exec } from 'child_process';
import { promisify } from 'util';
import path from 'path';
import { getErrorMessage as getErrorMessageShared, createLogError } from '../common.js';
import { FeatureLoader } from '../../services/feature-loader.js';
const logger = createLogger('Worktree');
export const execAsync = promisify(exec);
const featureLoader = new FeatureLoader();
// ============================================================================
// Secure Command Execution
// ============================================================================
/**
* Execute git command with array arguments to prevent command injection.
* Uses spawnProcess from @automaker/platform for secure, cross-platform execution.
*
* @param args - Array of git command arguments (e.g., ['worktree', 'add', path])
* @param cwd - Working directory to execute the command in
* @returns Promise resolving to stdout output
* @throws Error with stderr message if command fails
*
* @example
* ```typescript
* // Safe: no injection possible
* await execGitCommand(['branch', '-D', branchName], projectPath);
*
* // Instead of unsafe:
* // await execAsync(`git branch -D ${branchName}`, { cwd });
* ```
*/
export async function execGitCommand(args: string[], cwd: string): Promise<string> {
const result = await spawnProcess({
command: 'git',
args,
cwd,
});
// spawnProcess returns { stdout, stderr, exitCode }
if (result.exitCode === 0) {
return result.stdout;
} else {
const errorMessage = result.stderr || `Git command failed with code ${result.exitCode}`;
throw new Error(errorMessage);
}
}
// ============================================================================
// Constants
@@ -99,18 +135,6 @@ export function normalizePath(p: string): string {
return p.replace(/\\/g, '/');
}
/**
* Check if a path is a git repo
*/
export async function isGitRepo(repoPath: string): Promise<boolean> {
try {
await execAsync('git rev-parse --is-inside-work-tree', { cwd: repoPath });
return true;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Check if a git repository has at least one commit (i.e., HEAD exists)
* Returns false for freshly initialized repos with no commits

View File

@@ -3,7 +3,8 @@
*/
import type { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
import { isGitRepo, hasCommits } from './common.js';
import { isGitRepo } from '@automaker/git-utils';
import { hasCommits } from './common.js';
interface ValidationOptions {
/** Check if the path is a git repository (default: true) */

View File

@@ -13,12 +13,14 @@ import { promisify } from 'util';
import path from 'path';
import * as secureFs from '../../../lib/secure-fs.js';
import type { EventEmitter } from '../../../lib/events.js';
import { isGitRepo } from '@automaker/git-utils';
import {
isGitRepo,
getErrorMessage,
logError,
normalizePath,
ensureInitialCommit,
isValidBranchName,
execGitCommand,
} from '../common.js';
import { trackBranch } from './branch-tracking.js';
import { createLogger } from '@automaker/utils';
@@ -96,6 +98,26 @@ export function createCreateHandler(events: EventEmitter) {
return;
}
// Validate branch name to prevent command injection
if (!isValidBranchName(branchName)) {
res.status(400).json({
success: false,
error:
'Invalid branch name. Branch names must contain only letters, numbers, dots, hyphens, underscores, and forward slashes.',
});
return;
}
// Validate base branch if provided
if (baseBranch && !isValidBranchName(baseBranch) && baseBranch !== 'HEAD') {
res.status(400).json({
success: false,
error:
'Invalid base branch name. Branch names must contain only letters, numbers, dots, hyphens, underscores, and forward slashes.',
});
return;
}
if (!(await isGitRepo(projectPath))) {
res.status(400).json({
success: false,
@@ -145,30 +167,28 @@ export function createCreateHandler(events: EventEmitter) {
// Create worktrees directory if it doesn't exist
await secureFs.mkdir(worktreesDir, { recursive: true });
// Check if branch exists
// Check if branch exists (using array arguments to prevent injection)
let branchExists = false;
try {
await execAsync(`git rev-parse --verify ${branchName}`, {
cwd: projectPath,
});
await execGitCommand(['rev-parse', '--verify', branchName], projectPath);
branchExists = true;
} catch {
// Branch doesn't exist
}
// Create worktree
let createCmd: string;
// Create worktree (using array arguments to prevent injection)
if (branchExists) {
// Use existing branch
createCmd = `git worktree add "${worktreePath}" ${branchName}`;
await execGitCommand(['worktree', 'add', worktreePath, branchName], projectPath);
} else {
// Create new branch from base or HEAD
const base = baseBranch || 'HEAD';
createCmd = `git worktree add -b ${branchName} "${worktreePath}" ${base}`;
await execGitCommand(
['worktree', 'add', '-b', branchName, worktreePath, base],
projectPath
);
}
await execAsync(createCmd, { cwd: projectPath });
// Note: We intentionally do NOT symlink .automaker to worktrees
// Features and config are always accessed from the main project path
// This avoids symlink loop issues when activating worktrees

View File

@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@ import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import { exec } from 'child_process';
import { promisify } from 'util';
import { isGitRepo } from '@automaker/git-utils';
import { getErrorMessage, logError } from '../common.js';
import { getErrorMessage, logError, isValidBranchName, execGitCommand } from '../common.js';
import { createLogger } from '@automaker/utils';
const execAsync = promisify(exec);
const logger = createLogger('Worktree');
export function createDeleteHandler() {
return async (req: Request, res: Response): Promise<void> => {
@@ -46,22 +48,25 @@ export function createDeleteHandler() {
// Could not get branch name
}
// Remove the worktree
// Remove the worktree (using array arguments to prevent injection)
try {
await execAsync(`git worktree remove "${worktreePath}" --force`, {
cwd: projectPath,
});
await execGitCommand(['worktree', 'remove', worktreePath, '--force'], projectPath);
} catch (error) {
// Try with prune if remove fails
await execAsync('git worktree prune', { cwd: projectPath });
await execGitCommand(['worktree', 'prune'], projectPath);
}
// Optionally delete the branch
if (deleteBranch && branchName && branchName !== 'main' && branchName !== 'master') {
try {
await execAsync(`git branch -D ${branchName}`, { cwd: projectPath });
} catch {
// Branch deletion failed, not critical
// Validate branch name to prevent command injection
if (!isValidBranchName(branchName)) {
logger.warn(`Invalid branch name detected, skipping deletion: ${branchName}`);
} else {
try {
await execGitCommand(['branch', '-D', branchName], projectPath);
} catch {
// Branch deletion failed, not critical
}
}
}

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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
import type { Request, Response } from 'express';
import path from 'path';
import * as secureFs from '../../../lib/secure-fs.js';
import { getErrorMessage, logError } from '../common.js';
import { getErrorMessage, logError, isValidBranchName } from '../common.js';
import { createLogger } from '@automaker/utils';
import type { EventEmitter } from '../../../lib/events.js';
import { forceRunInitScript } from '../../../services/init-script-service.js';
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@ const logger = createLogger('InitScript');
/** Fixed path for init script within .automaker directory */
const INIT_SCRIPT_FILENAME = 'worktree-init.sh';
/** Maximum allowed size for init scripts (1MB) */
const MAX_SCRIPT_SIZE_BYTES = 1024 * 1024;
/**
* Get the full path to the init script for a project
*/
@@ -99,6 +102,31 @@ export function createPutInitScriptHandler() {
return;
}
// Validate script size to prevent disk exhaustion
const sizeBytes = Buffer.byteLength(content, 'utf-8');
if (sizeBytes > MAX_SCRIPT_SIZE_BYTES) {
res.status(400).json({
success: false,
error: `Script size (${Math.round(sizeBytes / 1024)}KB) exceeds maximum allowed size (${Math.round(MAX_SCRIPT_SIZE_BYTES / 1024)}KB)`,
});
return;
}
// Log warning if potentially dangerous patterns are detected (non-blocking)
const dangerousPatterns = [
/rm\s+-rf\s+\/(?!\s*\$)/i, // rm -rf / (not followed by variable)
/curl\s+.*\|\s*(?:bash|sh)/i, // curl | bash
/wget\s+.*\|\s*(?:bash|sh)/i, // wget | sh
];
for (const pattern of dangerousPatterns) {
if (pattern.test(content)) {
logger.warn(
`Init script contains potentially dangerous pattern: ${pattern.source}. User responsibility to verify script safety.`
);
}
}
const scriptPath = getInitScriptPath(projectPath);
const automakerDir = path.dirname(scriptPath);
@@ -193,6 +221,16 @@ export function createRunInitScriptHandler(events: EventEmitter) {
return;
}
// Validate branch name to prevent injection via environment variables
if (!isValidBranchName(branch)) {
res.status(400).json({
success: false,
error:
'Invalid branch name. Branch names must contain only letters, numbers, dots, hyphens, underscores, and forward slashes.',
});
return;
}
const scriptPath = getInitScriptPath(projectPath);
// Check if script exists

View File

@@ -191,22 +191,47 @@ export class InitScriptService {
branch,
});
// Spawn the script
// Build safe environment - only pass necessary variables, not all of process.env
// This prevents exposure of sensitive credentials like ANTHROPIC_API_KEY
const safeEnv: Record<string, string> = {
// Automaker-specific variables
AUTOMAKER_PROJECT_PATH: projectPath,
AUTOMAKER_WORKTREE_PATH: worktreePath,
AUTOMAKER_BRANCH: branch,
// Essential system variables
PATH: process.env.PATH || '',
HOME: process.env.HOME || '',
USER: process.env.USER || '',
TMPDIR: process.env.TMPDIR || process.env.TEMP || process.env.TMP || '/tmp',
// Shell and locale
SHELL: process.env.SHELL || '',
LANG: process.env.LANG || 'en_US.UTF-8',
LC_ALL: process.env.LC_ALL || '',
// Force color output even though we're not a TTY
FORCE_COLOR: '1',
npm_config_color: 'always',
CLICOLOR_FORCE: '1',
// Git configuration
GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0',
};
// Platform-specific additions
if (process.platform === 'win32') {
safeEnv.USERPROFILE = process.env.USERPROFILE || '';
safeEnv.APPDATA = process.env.APPDATA || '';
safeEnv.LOCALAPPDATA = process.env.LOCALAPPDATA || '';
safeEnv.SystemRoot = process.env.SystemRoot || 'C:\\Windows';
safeEnv.TEMP = process.env.TEMP || '';
}
// Spawn the script with safe environment
const child = spawn(shellCmd.shell, [...shellCmd.args, scriptPath], {
cwd: worktreePath,
env: {
...process.env,
// Provide useful env vars to the script
AUTOMAKER_PROJECT_PATH: projectPath,
AUTOMAKER_WORKTREE_PATH: worktreePath,
AUTOMAKER_BRANCH: branch,
// Force color output even though we're not a TTY
FORCE_COLOR: '1',
npm_config_color: 'always',
CLICOLOR_FORCE: '1',
// Git colors
GIT_TERMINAL_PROMPT: '0',
},
env: safeEnv,
stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
});