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13 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Leon van Zyl
95c3cafecd Merge pull request #101 from cabana8471-arch/feat/extensible-pkill-processes
feat: allow extending pkill process names via config
2026-01-26 13:05:09 +02:00
Auto
f1c529e1a7 Merge branch 'master' of https://github.com/leonvanzyl/autonomous-coding-ui 2026-01-26 12:41:06 +02:00
Auto
fe5f58cf45 add a pr review command 2026-01-26 12:41:01 +02:00
Leon van Zyl
a437af7f96 Merge pull request #102 from cabana8471-arch/fix/websocket-project-isolation
fix: prevent cross-project UI contamination
2026-01-26 10:32:06 +02:00
Leon van Zyl
0ef6cf7d62 Merge pull request #103 from cabana8471-arch/feat/webui-remote-access
feat: add --host argument for WebUI remote access
2026-01-26 10:27:05 +02:00
Leon van Zyl
aa9e8b1ab7 Merge pull request #104 from leonvanzyl/ollama-support
add ollama support
2026-01-26 09:50:22 +02:00
Auto
2dc12061fa chore: remove duplicate asset and gitignore local settings
- Remove assets/ollama.png (duplicate of ui/public/ollama.png)
- Remove .claude/settings.local.json from tracking
- Add .claude/settings.local.json to .gitignore

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-26 09:49:21 +02:00
Auto
095d248a66 add ollama support 2026-01-26 09:42:01 +02:00
cabana8471
34b9b5f5b2 security: validate all pkill patterns for BSD compatibility
pkill on BSD systems accepts multiple pattern operands. Previous code
only validated args[-1], allowing disallowed processes to slip through
when combined with allowed ones (e.g., "pkill node sshd" would only
check "sshd").

Now validates every non-flag argument to ensure no disallowed process
can be targeted. Added tests for multiple pattern scenarios.

Addresses CodeRabbit feedback on PR #101.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-25 20:12:54 +01:00
cabana8471
fed2516f08 security: validate pkill process names against safe character set
Address CodeRabbit security feedback - restrict pkill_processes entries
to alphanumeric names with dots, underscores, and hyphens only.

This prevents potential exploitation through regex metacharacters like
'.*' being registered as process names.

Changes:
- Added VALID_PROCESS_NAME_PATTERN regex constant
- Updated both org and project config validation to:
  - Normalize (trim whitespace) process names
  - Reject names with regex metacharacters
  - Reject names with spaces
- Added 3 new tests for regex validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-25 16:34:56 +01:00
cabana8471
be20c8a3ef feat: add --host argument for WebUI remote access (#81)
Users can now access the WebUI remotely (e.g., via VS Code tunnels,
remote servers) by specifying a host address:

    python start_ui.py --host 0.0.0.0
    python start_ui.py --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8888

Changes:
- Added --host and --port CLI arguments to start_ui.py
- Security warning displayed when remote access is enabled
- AUTOCODER_ALLOW_REMOTE env var passed to server
- server/main.py conditionally disables localhost middleware
- CORS updated to allow all origins when remote access is enabled
- Browser auto-open disabled for remote hosts

Security considerations documented in warning:
- File system access to project directories
- API can start/stop agents and modify files
- Recommend firewall or VPN for protection

Fixes: leonvanzyl/autocoder#81

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-25 12:14:23 +01:00
cabana8471
32c7778ee5 fix: prevent cross-project UI contamination (#71)
When running multiple projects simultaneously, UI would show mixed data
because the manager registry used only project_name as key. Projects with
the same name but different paths shared the same manager instance.

Changed manager registries to use composite key (project_name, resolved_path):
- server/services/process_manager.py: AgentProcessManager registry
- server/services/dev_server_manager.py: DevServerProcessManager registry

This ensures that:
- /old/my-app and /new/my-app get separate managers
- Multiple browser tabs viewing different projects stay isolated
- Project renames don't cause callback contamination

Fixes: leonvanzyl/autocoder#71
Also fixes: leonvanzyl/autocoder#62 (progress bar sync)
Also fixes: leonvanzyl/autocoder#61 (features missing in kanban)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-25 12:12:38 +01:00
cabana8471
dbbc7d5ce5 feat: allow extending pkill process names via config (#85)
Previously, pkill was limited to a hardcoded set of process names
(node, npm, npx, vite, next). Users building Python/Ruby/Go apps
couldn't kill their dev servers.

Changes:
- Added pkill_processes config option to org config (~/.autocoder/config.yaml)
- Added pkill_processes config option to project config (.autocoder/allowed_commands.yaml)
- Modified validate_pkill_command() to accept extra_processes parameter
- Added get_effective_pkill_processes() to merge default + org + project processes
- Updated bash_security_hook to pass configured processes to validator

Example usage:
```yaml
# ~/.autocoder/config.yaml
version: 1
pkill_processes:
  - python
  - uvicorn
  - gunicorn
```

Fixes: leonvanzyl/autocoder#85

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-25 12:11:58 +01:00
17 changed files with 568 additions and 80 deletions

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
---
description: Review pull requests
---
Pull request(s): $ARGUMENTS
- If no PR numbers are provided, ask the user to provide PR number(s).
- At least 1 PR is required.
## TASKS
- Use the GH CLI tool to retrieve the details (descriptions, divs, comments, feedback, reviews, etc)
- Use 3 deepdive subagents to analyze the impact of the codebase
- Provide a review on whether the PR is safe to merge as-is
- Provide any feedback in terms of risk level
- Propose any improments in terms of importance and complexity

View File

@@ -19,3 +19,20 @@
# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL=glm-4.7
# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL=glm-4.7
# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL=glm-4.5-air
# Ollama Local Model Configuration (Optional)
# To use local models via Ollama instead of Claude, uncomment and set these variables.
# Requires Ollama v0.14.0+ with Anthropic API compatibility.
# See: https://ollama.com/blog/claude
#
# ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434
# ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=ollama
# API_TIMEOUT_MS=3000000
# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL=qwen3-coder
# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL=qwen3-coder
# ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL=qwen3-coder
#
# Model recommendations:
# - For best results, use a capable coding model like qwen3-coder or deepseek-coder-v2
# - You can use the same model for all tiers, or different models per tier
# - Larger models (70B+) work best for Opus tier, smaller (7B-20B) for Haiku

5
.gitignore vendored
View File

@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ ui/playwright-report/
.dmypy.json
dmypy.json
# ===================
# Claude Code
# ===================
.claude/settings.local.json
# ===================
# IDE / Editors
# ===================

View File

@@ -256,6 +256,39 @@ python test_security_integration.py
- `examples/README.md` - Comprehensive guide with use cases, testing, and troubleshooting
- `PHASE3_SPEC.md` - Specification for mid-session approval feature (future enhancement)
### Ollama Local Models (Optional)
Run coding agents using local models via Ollama v0.14.0+:
1. Install Ollama: https://ollama.com
2. Start Ollama: `ollama serve`
3. Pull a coding model: `ollama pull qwen3-coder`
4. Configure `.env`:
```
ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL=http://localhost:11434
ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN=ollama
API_TIMEOUT_MS=3000000
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_SONNET_MODEL=qwen3-coder
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_OPUS_MODEL=qwen3-coder
ANTHROPIC_DEFAULT_HAIKU_MODEL=qwen3-coder
```
5. Run autocoder normally - it will use your local Ollama models
**Recommended coding models:**
- `qwen3-coder` - Good balance of speed and capability
- `deepseek-coder-v2` - Strong coding performance
- `codellama` - Meta's code-focused model
**Model tier mapping:**
- Use the same model for all tiers, or map different models per capability level
- Larger models (70B+) work best for Opus tier
- Smaller models (7B-20B) work well for Haiku tier
**Known limitations:**
- Smaller context windows than Claude (model-dependent)
- Extended context beta disabled (not supported by Ollama)
- Performance depends on local hardware (GPU recommended)
## Claude Code Integration
- `.claude/commands/create-spec.md` - `/create-spec` slash command for interactive spec creation

View File

@@ -257,9 +257,16 @@ def create_client(
if value:
sdk_env[var] = value
# Detect alternative API mode (Ollama or GLM)
base_url = sdk_env.get("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "")
is_alternative_api = bool(base_url)
is_ollama = "localhost:11434" in base_url or "127.0.0.1:11434" in base_url
if sdk_env:
print(f" - API overrides: {', '.join(sdk_env.keys())}")
if "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL" in sdk_env:
if is_ollama:
print(" - Ollama Mode: Using local models")
elif "ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL" in sdk_env:
print(f" - GLM Mode: Using {sdk_env['ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL']}")
# Create a wrapper for bash_security_hook that passes project_dir via context
@@ -336,7 +343,8 @@ def create_client(
# Enable extended context beta for better handling of long sessions.
# This provides up to 1M tokens of context with automatic compaction.
# See: https://docs.anthropic.com/en/api/beta-headers
betas=["context-1m-2025-08-07"],
# Disabled for alternative APIs (Ollama, GLM) as they don't support Claude-specific betas.
betas=[] if is_alternative_api else ["context-1m-2025-08-07"],
# Note on context management:
# The Claude Agent SDK handles context management automatically through the
# underlying Claude Code CLI. When context approaches limits, the CLI

View File

@@ -7,12 +7,17 @@ Uses an allowlist approach - only explicitly permitted commands can run.
"""
import os
import re
import shlex
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Optional
import yaml
# Regex pattern for valid pkill process names (no regex metacharacters allowed)
# Matches alphanumeric names with dots, underscores, and hyphens
VALID_PROCESS_NAME_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9._-]+$")
# Allowed commands for development tasks
# Minimal set needed for the autonomous coding demo
ALLOWED_COMMANDS = {
@@ -219,23 +224,37 @@ def extract_commands(command_string: str) -> list[str]:
return commands
def validate_pkill_command(command_string: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
# Default pkill process names (hardcoded baseline, always available)
DEFAULT_PKILL_PROCESSES = {
"node",
"npm",
"npx",
"vite",
"next",
}
def validate_pkill_command(
command_string: str,
extra_processes: Optional[set[str]] = None
) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""
Validate pkill commands - only allow killing dev-related processes.
Uses shlex to parse the command, avoiding regex bypass vulnerabilities.
Args:
command_string: The pkill command to validate
extra_processes: Optional set of additional process names to allow
(from org/project config pkill_processes)
Returns:
Tuple of (is_allowed, reason_if_blocked)
"""
# Allowed process names for pkill
allowed_process_names = {
"node",
"npm",
"npx",
"vite",
"next",
}
# Merge default processes with any extra configured processes
allowed_process_names = DEFAULT_PKILL_PROCESSES.copy()
if extra_processes:
allowed_process_names |= extra_processes
try:
tokens = shlex.split(command_string)
@@ -254,17 +273,19 @@ def validate_pkill_command(command_string: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
if not args:
return False, "pkill requires a process name"
# The target is typically the last non-flag argument
target = args[-1]
# Validate every non-flag argument (pkill accepts multiple patterns on BSD)
# This defensively ensures no disallowed process can be targeted
targets = []
for arg in args:
# For -f flag (full command line match), take the first word as process name
# e.g., "pkill -f 'node server.js'" -> target is "node server.js", process is "node"
t = arg.split()[0] if " " in arg else arg
targets.append(t)
# For -f flag (full command line match), extract the first word as process name
# e.g., "pkill -f 'node server.js'" -> target is "node server.js", process is "node"
if " " in target:
target = target.split()[0]
if target in allowed_process_names:
disallowed = [t for t in targets if t not in allowed_process_names]
if not disallowed:
return True, ""
return False, f"pkill only allowed for dev processes: {allowed_process_names}"
return False, f"pkill only allowed for processes: {sorted(allowed_process_names)}"
def validate_chmod_command(command_string: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
@@ -455,6 +476,23 @@ def load_org_config() -> Optional[dict]:
if not isinstance(cmd, str):
return None
# Validate pkill_processes if present
if "pkill_processes" in config:
processes = config["pkill_processes"]
if not isinstance(processes, list):
return None
# Normalize and validate each process name against safe pattern
normalized = []
for proc in processes:
if not isinstance(proc, str):
return None
proc = proc.strip()
# Block empty strings and regex metacharacters
if not proc or not VALID_PROCESS_NAME_PATTERN.fullmatch(proc):
return None
normalized.append(proc)
config["pkill_processes"] = normalized
return config
except (yaml.YAMLError, IOError, OSError):
@@ -508,6 +546,23 @@ def load_project_commands(project_dir: Path) -> Optional[dict]:
if not isinstance(cmd["name"], str):
return None
# Validate pkill_processes if present
if "pkill_processes" in config:
processes = config["pkill_processes"]
if not isinstance(processes, list):
return None
# Normalize and validate each process name against safe pattern
normalized = []
for proc in processes:
if not isinstance(proc, str):
return None
proc = proc.strip()
# Block empty strings and regex metacharacters
if not proc or not VALID_PROCESS_NAME_PATTERN.fullmatch(proc):
return None
normalized.append(proc)
config["pkill_processes"] = normalized
return config
except (yaml.YAMLError, IOError, OSError):
@@ -628,6 +683,42 @@ def get_project_allowed_commands(project_dir: Optional[Path]) -> set[str]:
return allowed
def get_effective_pkill_processes(project_dir: Optional[Path]) -> set[str]:
"""
Get effective pkill process names after hierarchy resolution.
Merges processes from:
1. DEFAULT_PKILL_PROCESSES (hardcoded baseline)
2. Org config pkill_processes
3. Project config pkill_processes
Args:
project_dir: Path to the project directory, or None
Returns:
Set of allowed process names for pkill
"""
# Start with default processes
processes = DEFAULT_PKILL_PROCESSES.copy()
# Add org-level pkill_processes
org_config = load_org_config()
if org_config:
org_processes = org_config.get("pkill_processes", [])
if isinstance(org_processes, list):
processes |= {p for p in org_processes if isinstance(p, str) and p.strip()}
# Add project-level pkill_processes
if project_dir:
project_config = load_project_commands(project_dir)
if project_config:
proj_processes = project_config.get("pkill_processes", [])
if isinstance(proj_processes, list):
processes |= {p for p in proj_processes if isinstance(p, str) and p.strip()}
return processes
def is_command_allowed(command: str, allowed_commands: set[str]) -> bool:
"""
Check if a command is allowed (supports patterns).
@@ -692,6 +783,9 @@ async def bash_security_hook(input_data, tool_use_id=None, context=None):
# Get effective commands using hierarchy resolution
allowed_commands, blocked_commands = get_effective_commands(project_dir)
# Get effective pkill processes (includes org/project config)
pkill_processes = get_effective_pkill_processes(project_dir)
# Split into segments for per-command validation
segments = split_command_segments(command)
@@ -725,7 +819,9 @@ async def bash_security_hook(input_data, tool_use_id=None, context=None):
cmd_segment = command # Fallback to full command
if cmd == "pkill":
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command(cmd_segment)
# Pass configured extra processes (beyond defaults)
extra_procs = pkill_processes - DEFAULT_PKILL_PROCESSES
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command(cmd_segment, extra_procs if extra_procs else None)
if not allowed:
return {"decision": "block", "reason": reason}
elif cmd == "chmod":

View File

@@ -88,35 +88,49 @@ app = FastAPI(
lifespan=lifespan,
)
# CORS - allow only localhost origins for security
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=[
"http://localhost:5173", # Vite dev server
"http://127.0.0.1:5173",
"http://localhost:8888", # Production
"http://127.0.0.1:8888",
],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# Check if remote access is enabled via environment variable
# Set by start_ui.py when --host is not 127.0.0.1
ALLOW_REMOTE = os.environ.get("AUTOCODER_ALLOW_REMOTE", "").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
# CORS - allow all origins when remote access is enabled, otherwise localhost only
if ALLOW_REMOTE:
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=["*"], # Allow all origins for remote access
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
else:
app.add_middleware(
CORSMiddleware,
allow_origins=[
"http://localhost:5173", # Vite dev server
"http://127.0.0.1:5173",
"http://localhost:8888", # Production
"http://127.0.0.1:8888",
],
allow_credentials=True,
allow_methods=["*"],
allow_headers=["*"],
)
# ============================================================================
# Security Middleware
# ============================================================================
@app.middleware("http")
async def require_localhost(request: Request, call_next):
"""Only allow requests from localhost."""
client_host = request.client.host if request.client else None
if not ALLOW_REMOTE:
@app.middleware("http")
async def require_localhost(request: Request, call_next):
"""Only allow requests from localhost (disabled when AUTOCODER_ALLOW_REMOTE=1)."""
client_host = request.client.host if request.client else None
# Allow localhost connections
if client_host not in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", None):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Localhost access only")
# Allow localhost connections
if client_host not in ("127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost", None):
raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Localhost access only")
return await call_next(request)
return await call_next(request)
# ============================================================================

View File

@@ -40,7 +40,15 @@ def _parse_yolo_mode(value: str | None) -> bool:
def _is_glm_mode() -> bool:
"""Check if GLM API is configured via environment variables."""
return bool(os.getenv("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL"))
base_url = os.getenv("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "")
# GLM mode is when ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL is set but NOT pointing to Ollama
return bool(base_url) and not _is_ollama_mode()
def _is_ollama_mode() -> bool:
"""Check if Ollama API is configured via environment variables."""
base_url = os.getenv("ANTHROPIC_BASE_URL", "")
return "localhost:11434" in base_url or "127.0.0.1:11434" in base_url
@router.get("/models", response_model=ModelsResponse)
@@ -82,6 +90,7 @@ async def get_settings():
yolo_mode=_parse_yolo_mode(all_settings.get("yolo_mode")),
model=all_settings.get("model", DEFAULT_MODEL),
glm_mode=_is_glm_mode(),
ollama_mode=_is_ollama_mode(),
testing_agent_ratio=_parse_int(all_settings.get("testing_agent_ratio"), 1),
)
@@ -104,5 +113,6 @@ async def update_settings(update: SettingsUpdate):
yolo_mode=_parse_yolo_mode(all_settings.get("yolo_mode")),
model=all_settings.get("model", DEFAULT_MODEL),
glm_mode=_is_glm_mode(),
ollama_mode=_is_ollama_mode(),
testing_agent_ratio=_parse_int(all_settings.get("testing_agent_ratio"), 1),
)

View File

@@ -382,6 +382,7 @@ class SettingsResponse(BaseModel):
yolo_mode: bool = False
model: str = DEFAULT_MODEL
glm_mode: bool = False # True if GLM API is configured via .env
ollama_mode: bool = False # True if Ollama API is configured via .env
testing_agent_ratio: int = 1 # Regression testing agents (0-3)

View File

@@ -428,7 +428,9 @@ class DevServerProcessManager:
# Global registry of dev server managers per project with thread safety
_managers: dict[str, DevServerProcessManager] = {}
# Key is (project_name, resolved_project_dir) to prevent cross-project contamination
# when different projects share the same name but have different paths
_managers: dict[tuple[str, str], DevServerProcessManager] = {}
_managers_lock = threading.Lock()
@@ -444,18 +446,11 @@ def get_devserver_manager(project_name: str, project_dir: Path) -> DevServerProc
DevServerProcessManager instance for the project
"""
with _managers_lock:
if project_name in _managers:
manager = _managers[project_name]
# Update project_dir in case project was moved
if manager.project_dir.resolve() != project_dir.resolve():
logger.info(
f"Project {project_name} path updated: {manager.project_dir} -> {project_dir}"
)
manager.project_dir = project_dir
manager.lock_file = project_dir / ".devserver.lock"
return manager
_managers[project_name] = DevServerProcessManager(project_name, project_dir)
return _managers[project_name]
# Use composite key to prevent cross-project UI contamination (#71)
key = (project_name, str(project_dir.resolve()))
if key not in _managers:
_managers[key] = DevServerProcessManager(project_name, project_dir)
return _managers[key]
async def cleanup_all_devservers() -> None:

View File

@@ -510,7 +510,9 @@ class AgentProcessManager:
# Global registry of process managers per project with thread safety
_managers: dict[str, AgentProcessManager] = {}
# Key is (project_name, resolved_project_dir) to prevent cross-project contamination
# when different projects share the same name but have different paths
_managers: dict[tuple[str, str], AgentProcessManager] = {}
_managers_lock = threading.Lock()
@@ -523,9 +525,11 @@ def get_manager(project_name: str, project_dir: Path, root_dir: Path) -> AgentPr
root_dir: Root directory of the autonomous-coding-ui project
"""
with _managers_lock:
if project_name not in _managers:
_managers[project_name] = AgentProcessManager(project_name, project_dir, root_dir)
return _managers[project_name]
# Use composite key to prevent cross-project UI contamination (#71)
key = (project_name, str(project_dir.resolve()))
if key not in _managers:
_managers[key] = AgentProcessManager(project_name, project_dir, root_dir)
return _managers[key]
async def cleanup_all_managers() -> None:

View File

@@ -13,12 +13,16 @@ Automated launcher that handles all setup:
7. Opens browser to the UI
Usage:
python start_ui.py [--dev]
python start_ui.py [--dev] [--host HOST] [--port PORT]
Options:
--dev Run in development mode with Vite hot reload
--dev Run in development mode with Vite hot reload
--host HOST Host to bind to (default: 127.0.0.1)
Use 0.0.0.0 for remote access (security warning will be shown)
--port PORT Port to bind to (default: 8888)
"""
import argparse
import asyncio
import os
import shutil
@@ -235,26 +239,31 @@ def build_frontend() -> bool:
return run_command([npm_cmd, "run", "build"], cwd=UI_DIR)
def start_dev_server(port: int) -> tuple:
def start_dev_server(port: int, host: str = "127.0.0.1") -> tuple:
"""Start both Vite and FastAPI in development mode."""
venv_python = get_venv_python()
print("\n Starting development servers...")
print(f" - FastAPI backend: http://127.0.0.1:{port}")
print(f" - FastAPI backend: http://{host}:{port}")
print(" - Vite frontend: http://127.0.0.1:5173")
# Set environment for remote access if needed
env = os.environ.copy()
if host != "127.0.0.1":
env["AUTOCODER_ALLOW_REMOTE"] = "1"
# Start FastAPI
backend = subprocess.Popen([
str(venv_python), "-m", "uvicorn",
"server.main:app",
"--host", "127.0.0.1",
"--host", host,
"--port", str(port),
"--reload"
], cwd=str(ROOT))
], cwd=str(ROOT), env=env)
# Start Vite with API port env var for proxy configuration
npm_cmd = "npm.cmd" if sys.platform == "win32" else "npm"
vite_env = os.environ.copy()
vite_env = env.copy()
vite_env["VITE_API_PORT"] = str(port)
frontend = subprocess.Popen([
npm_cmd, "run", "dev"
@@ -263,15 +272,18 @@ def start_dev_server(port: int) -> tuple:
return backend, frontend
def start_production_server(port: int):
"""Start FastAPI server in production mode with hot reload."""
def start_production_server(port: int, host: str = "127.0.0.1"):
"""Start FastAPI server in production mode."""
venv_python = get_venv_python()
print(f"\n Starting server at http://127.0.0.1:{port} (with hot reload)")
print(f"\n Starting server at http://{host}:{port}")
# Set PYTHONASYNCIODEBUG to help with Windows subprocess issues
env = os.environ.copy()
# Enable remote access in server if not localhost
if host != "127.0.0.1":
env["AUTOCODER_ALLOW_REMOTE"] = "1"
# NOTE: --reload is NOT used because on Windows it breaks asyncio subprocess
# support (uvicorn's reload worker doesn't inherit the ProactorEventLoop policy).
# This affects Claude SDK which uses asyncio.create_subprocess_exec.
@@ -279,14 +291,34 @@ def start_production_server(port: int):
return subprocess.Popen([
str(venv_python), "-m", "uvicorn",
"server.main:app",
"--host", "127.0.0.1",
"--host", host,
"--port", str(port),
], cwd=str(ROOT), env=env)
def main() -> None:
"""Main entry point."""
dev_mode = "--dev" in sys.argv
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="AutoCoder UI Launcher")
parser.add_argument("--dev", action="store_true", help="Run in development mode with Vite hot reload")
parser.add_argument("--host", default="127.0.0.1", help="Host to bind to (default: 127.0.0.1)")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=None, help="Port to bind to (default: auto-detect from 8888)")
args = parser.parse_args()
dev_mode = args.dev
host = args.host
# Security warning for remote access
if host != "127.0.0.1":
print("\n" + "!" * 50)
print(" SECURITY WARNING")
print("!" * 50)
print(f" Remote access enabled on host: {host}")
print(" The AutoCoder UI will be accessible from other machines.")
print(" Ensure you understand the security implications:")
print(" - The agent has file system access to project directories")
print(" - The API can start/stop agents and modify files")
print(" - Consider using a firewall or VPN for protection")
print("!" * 50 + "\n")
print("=" * 50)
print(" AutoCoder UI Setup")
@@ -335,18 +367,20 @@ def main() -> None:
step = 5 if dev_mode else 6
print_step(step, total_steps, "Starting server")
port = find_available_port()
port = args.port if args.port else find_available_port()
try:
if dev_mode:
backend, frontend = start_dev_server(port)
backend, frontend = start_dev_server(port, host)
# Open browser to Vite dev server
# Open browser to Vite dev server (always localhost for Vite)
time.sleep(3)
webbrowser.open("http://127.0.0.1:5173")
print("\n" + "=" * 50)
print(" Development mode active")
if host != "127.0.0.1":
print(f" Backend accessible at: http://{host}:{port}")
print(" Press Ctrl+C to stop")
print("=" * 50)
@@ -362,14 +396,15 @@ def main() -> None:
backend.wait()
frontend.wait()
else:
server = start_production_server(port)
server = start_production_server(port, host)
# Open browser
# Open browser (only if localhost)
time.sleep(2)
webbrowser.open(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}")
if host == "127.0.0.1":
webbrowser.open(f"http://127.0.0.1:{port}")
print("\n" + "=" * 50)
print(f" Server running at http://127.0.0.1:{port}")
print(f" Server running at http://{host}:{port}")
print(" Press Ctrl+C to stop")
print("=" * 50)

View File

@@ -15,14 +15,17 @@ from contextlib import contextmanager
from pathlib import Path
from security import (
DEFAULT_PKILL_PROCESSES,
bash_security_hook,
extract_commands,
get_effective_commands,
get_effective_pkill_processes,
load_org_config,
load_project_commands,
matches_pattern,
validate_chmod_command,
validate_init_script,
validate_pkill_command,
validate_project_command,
)
@@ -670,6 +673,240 @@ blocked_commands:
return passed, failed
def test_pkill_extensibility():
"""Test that pkill processes can be extended via config."""
print("\nTesting pkill process extensibility:\n")
passed = 0
failed = 0
# Test 1: Default processes work without config
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill node")
if allowed:
print(" PASS: Default process 'node' allowed")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Default process 'node' should be allowed: {reason}")
failed += 1
# Test 2: Non-default process blocked without config
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill python")
if not allowed:
print(" PASS: Non-default process 'python' blocked without config")
passed += 1
else:
print(" FAIL: Non-default process 'python' should be blocked without config")
failed += 1
# Test 3: Extra processes allowed when passed
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill python", extra_processes={"python"})
if allowed:
print(" PASS: Extra process 'python' allowed when configured")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Extra process 'python' should be allowed when configured: {reason}")
failed += 1
# Test 4: Default processes still work with extra processes
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill npm", extra_processes={"python"})
if allowed:
print(" PASS: Default process 'npm' still works with extra processes")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Default process should still work: {reason}")
failed += 1
# Test 5: Test get_effective_pkill_processes with org config
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
org_dir = Path(tmphome) / ".autocoder"
org_dir.mkdir()
org_config_path = org_dir / "config.yaml"
# Create org config with extra pkill processes
org_config_path.write_text("""version: 1
pkill_processes:
- python
- uvicorn
""")
project_dir = Path(tmpproject)
processes = get_effective_pkill_processes(project_dir)
# Should include defaults + org processes
if "node" in processes and "python" in processes and "uvicorn" in processes:
print(" PASS: Org pkill_processes merged with defaults")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Expected node, python, uvicorn in {processes}")
failed += 1
# Test 6: Test get_effective_pkill_processes with project config
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
project_dir = Path(tmpproject)
project_autocoder = project_dir / ".autocoder"
project_autocoder.mkdir()
project_config = project_autocoder / "allowed_commands.yaml"
# Create project config with extra pkill processes
project_config.write_text("""version: 1
commands: []
pkill_processes:
- gunicorn
- flask
""")
processes = get_effective_pkill_processes(project_dir)
# Should include defaults + project processes
if "node" in processes and "gunicorn" in processes and "flask" in processes:
print(" PASS: Project pkill_processes merged with defaults")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Expected node, gunicorn, flask in {processes}")
failed += 1
# Test 7: Integration test - pkill python blocked by default
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
project_dir = Path(tmpproject)
input_data = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "pkill python"}}
context = {"project_dir": str(project_dir)}
result = asyncio.run(bash_security_hook(input_data, context=context))
if result.get("decision") == "block":
print(" PASS: pkill python blocked without config")
passed += 1
else:
print(" FAIL: pkill python should be blocked without config")
failed += 1
# Test 8: Integration test - pkill python allowed with org config
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
org_dir = Path(tmphome) / ".autocoder"
org_dir.mkdir()
org_config_path = org_dir / "config.yaml"
org_config_path.write_text("""version: 1
pkill_processes:
- python
""")
project_dir = Path(tmpproject)
input_data = {"tool_name": "Bash", "tool_input": {"command": "pkill python"}}
context = {"project_dir": str(project_dir)}
result = asyncio.run(bash_security_hook(input_data, context=context))
if result.get("decision") != "block":
print(" PASS: pkill python allowed with org config")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: pkill python should be allowed with org config: {result}")
failed += 1
# Test 9: Regex metacharacters should be rejected in pkill_processes
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
org_dir = Path(tmphome) / ".autocoder"
org_dir.mkdir()
org_config_path = org_dir / "config.yaml"
# Try to register a regex pattern (should be rejected)
org_config_path.write_text("""version: 1
pkill_processes:
- ".*"
""")
config = load_org_config()
if config is None:
print(" PASS: Regex pattern '.*' rejected in pkill_processes")
passed += 1
else:
print(" FAIL: Regex pattern '.*' should be rejected")
failed += 1
# Test 10: Valid process names with dots/underscores/hyphens should be accepted
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
org_dir = Path(tmphome) / ".autocoder"
org_dir.mkdir()
org_config_path = org_dir / "config.yaml"
# Valid names with special chars
org_config_path.write_text("""version: 1
pkill_processes:
- my-app
- app_server
- node.js
""")
config = load_org_config()
if config is not None and config.get("pkill_processes") == ["my-app", "app_server", "node.js"]:
print(" PASS: Valid process names with dots/underscores/hyphens accepted")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Valid process names should be accepted: {config}")
failed += 1
# Test 11: Names with spaces should be rejected
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmphome:
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpproject:
with temporary_home(tmphome):
org_dir = Path(tmphome) / ".autocoder"
org_dir.mkdir()
org_config_path = org_dir / "config.yaml"
org_config_path.write_text("""version: 1
pkill_processes:
- "my app"
""")
config = load_org_config()
if config is None:
print(" PASS: Process name with space rejected")
passed += 1
else:
print(" FAIL: Process name with space should be rejected")
failed += 1
# Test 12: Multiple patterns - all must be allowed (BSD behavior)
# On BSD, "pkill node sshd" would kill both, so we must validate all patterns
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill node npm")
if allowed:
print(" PASS: Multiple allowed patterns accepted")
passed += 1
else:
print(f" FAIL: Multiple allowed patterns should be accepted: {reason}")
failed += 1
# Test 13: Multiple patterns - block if any is disallowed
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill node sshd")
if not allowed:
print(" PASS: Multiple patterns blocked when one is disallowed")
passed += 1
else:
print(" FAIL: Should block when any pattern is disallowed")
failed += 1
# Test 14: Multiple patterns - only first allowed, second disallowed
allowed, reason = validate_pkill_command("pkill npm python")
if not allowed:
print(" PASS: Multiple patterns blocked (first allowed, second not)")
passed += 1
else:
print(" FAIL: Should block when second pattern is disallowed")
failed += 1
return passed, failed
def main():
print("=" * 70)
print(" SECURITY HOOK TESTS")
@@ -733,6 +970,11 @@ def main():
passed += org_block_passed
failed += org_block_failed
# Test pkill process extensibility
pkill_passed, pkill_failed = test_pkill_extensibility()
passed += pkill_passed
failed += pkill_failed
# Commands that SHOULD be blocked
print("\nCommands that should be BLOCKED:\n")
dangerous = [

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View File

@@ -298,6 +298,17 @@ function App() {
<Settings size={18} />
</button>
{/* Ollama Mode Indicator */}
{settings?.ollama_mode && (
<div
className="flex items-center gap-1.5 px-2 py-1 bg-white rounded border-2 border-neo-border shadow-neo-sm"
title="Using Ollama local models (configured via .env)"
>
<img src="/ollama.png" alt="Ollama" className="w-5 h-5" />
<span className="text-xs font-bold text-neo-text">Ollama</span>
</div>
)}
{/* GLM Mode Badge */}
{settings?.glm_mode && (
<span

View File

@@ -237,6 +237,7 @@ const DEFAULT_SETTINGS: Settings = {
yolo_mode: false,
model: 'claude-opus-4-5-20251101',
glm_mode: false,
ollama_mode: false,
testing_agent_ratio: 1,
}

View File

@@ -526,6 +526,7 @@ export interface Settings {
yolo_mode: boolean
model: string
glm_mode: boolean
ollama_mode: boolean
testing_agent_ratio: number // Regression testing agents (0-3)
}