fix: harden dev server RCE mitigations from PR #153

Address security gaps and improve validation in the dev server command
execution path introduced by PR #153:

Security fixes (critical):
- Add missing shell metacharacters to dangerous_ops blocklist: single &
  (Windows cmd.exe command separator), >, <, ^, %, \n, \r
- The single & gap was a confirmed RCE bypass on Windows where .cmd
  files are always executed via cmd.exe even with shell=False (CPython
  limitation documented in issue #77696)
- Apply validate_custom_command_strict at /start endpoint for
  defense-in-depth against config file tampering

Validation improvements:
- Fix uvicorn --flag=value syntax (split on = before comparing)
- Expand Python support: Django (manage.py), Flask, custom .py scripts
- Add runners: flask, poetry, cargo, go, npx
- Expand npm script allowlist: serve, develop, server, preview
- Reorder PATCH /config validation to run strict check first (fail fast)
- Extract constants: ALLOWED_NPM_SCRIPTS, ALLOWED_PYTHON_MODULES,
  BLOCKED_SHELLS for reuse and testability

Cleanup:
- Remove unused security.py imports from dev_server_manager.py
- Fix deprecated datetime.utcnow() -> datetime.now(timezone.utc)
- Remove unnecessary _remove_lock() in exception handlers where lock
  was never created (Popen failure path)

Tests:
- Add test_devserver_security.py with 78 tests covering valid commands,
  blocked shells, blocked commands, injection attempts, dangerous_ops
  blocking, and constant verification

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Auto
2026-02-05 08:52:47 +02:00
parent 75766a433a
commit c55a1a0182
3 changed files with 418 additions and 31 deletions

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test_devserver_security.py Normal file
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Dev Server Security Tests
=========================
Tests for dev server command validation and security hardening.
Run with: python -m pytest test_devserver_security.py -v
"""
import sys
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
# Add project root to path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
from server.routers.devserver import (
ALLOWED_NPM_SCRIPTS,
ALLOWED_PYTHON_MODULES,
ALLOWED_RUNNERS,
BLOCKED_SHELLS,
validate_custom_command_strict,
)
# =============================================================================
# validate_custom_command_strict - Valid commands
# =============================================================================
class TestValidCommands:
"""Commands that should pass validation."""
def test_npm_run_dev(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("npm run dev")
def test_npm_run_start(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("npm run start")
def test_npm_run_serve(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("npm run serve")
def test_npm_run_preview(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("npm run preview")
def test_pnpm_dev(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("pnpm dev")
def test_pnpm_run_dev(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("pnpm run dev")
def test_yarn_start(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("yarn start")
def test_yarn_run_serve(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("yarn run serve")
def test_uvicorn_basic(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("uvicorn main:app")
def test_uvicorn_with_flags(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("uvicorn main:app --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8000 --reload")
def test_uvicorn_flag_equals_syntax(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("uvicorn main:app --port=8000 --host=0.0.0.0")
def test_python_m_uvicorn(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -m uvicorn main:app --reload")
def test_python3_m_uvicorn(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python3 -m uvicorn main:app")
def test_python_m_flask(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -m flask run")
def test_python_m_gunicorn(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -m gunicorn main:app")
def test_python_m_http_server(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -m http.server 8000")
def test_python_script(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python app.py")
def test_python_manage_py_runserver(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python manage.py runserver")
def test_python_manage_py_runserver_with_port(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("python manage.py runserver 0.0.0.0:8000")
def test_flask_run(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("flask run")
def test_flask_run_with_options(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("flask run --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5000")
def test_poetry_run_command(self):
validate_custom_command_strict("poetry run python app.py")
def test_cargo_run(self):
# cargo is allowed but has no special sub-validation
validate_custom_command_strict("cargo run")
def test_go_run(self):
# go is allowed but has no special sub-validation
validate_custom_command_strict("go run .")
# =============================================================================
# validate_custom_command_strict - Blocked shells
# =============================================================================
class TestBlockedShells:
"""Shell interpreters that must be rejected."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("shell", ["sh", "bash", "zsh", "cmd", "powershell", "pwsh", "cmd.exe"])
def test_blocked_shell(self, shell):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="runner not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict(f"{shell} -c 'echo hacked'")
# =============================================================================
# validate_custom_command_strict - Blocked commands
# =============================================================================
class TestBlockedCommands:
"""Commands that should be rejected."""
def test_empty_command(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
validate_custom_command_strict("")
def test_whitespace_only(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
validate_custom_command_strict(" ")
def test_python_dash_c(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="python -c is not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -c 'import os; os.system(\"rm -rf /\")'")
def test_python3_dash_c(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="python -c is not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("python3 -c 'print(1)'")
def test_python_no_script_or_module(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must use"):
validate_custom_command_strict("python --version")
def test_python_m_disallowed_module(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -m pip install something")
def test_unknown_runner(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="runner not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("curl http://evil.com")
def test_rm_rf(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="runner not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("rm -rf /")
def test_npm_arbitrary_script(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="npm custom_command"):
validate_custom_command_strict("npm run postinstall")
def test_npm_exec(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="npm custom_command"):
validate_custom_command_strict("npm exec evil-package")
def test_pnpm_arbitrary_script(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="pnpm custom_command"):
validate_custom_command_strict("pnpm run postinstall")
def test_yarn_arbitrary_script(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="yarn custom_command"):
validate_custom_command_strict("yarn run postinstall")
def test_uvicorn_no_app(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must specify an app"):
validate_custom_command_strict("uvicorn --reload")
def test_uvicorn_disallowed_flag(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="flag not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("uvicorn main:app --factory")
def test_flask_no_run(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="flask custom_command"):
validate_custom_command_strict("flask shell")
def test_poetry_no_run(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="poetry custom_command"):
validate_custom_command_strict("poetry install")
# =============================================================================
# validate_custom_command_strict - Injection attempts
# =============================================================================
class TestInjectionAttempts:
"""Adversarial inputs that attempt to bypass validation."""
def test_shell_via_path_traversal(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="runner not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("/bin/sh -c 'echo hacked'")
def test_shell_via_relative_path(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="runner not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("../../bin/bash -c whoami")
def test_none_input(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
validate_custom_command_strict(None) # type: ignore[arg-type]
def test_integer_input(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="cannot be empty"):
validate_custom_command_strict(123) # type: ignore[arg-type]
def test_python_dash_c_uppercase(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="python -c is not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("python -C 'exec(evil)'")
def test_powershell_via_path(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="runner not allowed"):
validate_custom_command_strict("C:\\Windows\\System32\\powershell.exe -c Get-Process")
# =============================================================================
# dev_server_manager.py - dangerous_ops blocking
# =============================================================================
class TestDangerousOpsBlocking:
"""Test the metacharacter blocking in dev_server_manager.start()."""
@pytest.fixture
def manager(self, tmp_path):
from server.services.dev_server_manager import DevServerProcessManager
return DevServerProcessManager("test-project", tmp_path)
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize("cmd,desc", [
("npm run dev && curl evil.com", "double ampersand"),
("npm run dev & curl evil.com", "single ampersand"),
("npm run dev || curl evil.com", "double pipe"),
("npm run dev | curl evil.com", "single pipe"),
("npm run dev ; curl evil.com", "semicolon"),
("npm run dev `curl evil.com`", "backtick"),
("npm run dev $(curl evil.com)", "dollar paren"),
("npm run dev > /etc/passwd", "output redirect"),
("npm run dev < /etc/passwd", "input redirect"),
("npm run dev ^& calc", "caret escape"),
("npm run %COMSPEC%", "percent env expansion"),
])
async def test_blocks_shell_operator(self, manager, cmd, desc):
success, message = await manager.start(cmd)
assert not success, f"Should block {desc}: {cmd}"
assert "not allowed" in message.lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_blocks_newline_injection(self, manager):
success, message = await manager.start("npm run dev\ncurl evil.com")
assert not success
assert "newline" in message.lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_blocks_carriage_return(self, manager):
success, message = await manager.start("npm run dev\r\ncurl evil.com")
assert not success
assert "newline" in message.lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
@pytest.mark.parametrize("shell", ["sh", "bash", "zsh", "cmd", "powershell", "pwsh"])
async def test_blocks_shell_runners(self, manager, shell):
success, message = await manager.start(f"{shell} -c 'echo hacked'")
assert not success
assert "not allowed" in message.lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_blocks_empty_command(self, manager):
success, message = await manager.start("")
assert not success
assert "empty" in message.lower()
@pytest.mark.asyncio
async def test_blocks_whitespace_command(self, manager):
success, message = await manager.start(" ")
assert not success
assert "empty" in message.lower()
# =============================================================================
# Constants validation
# =============================================================================
class TestConstants:
"""Verify security constants are properly defined."""
def test_all_common_shells_blocked(self):
for shell in ["sh", "bash", "zsh", "cmd", "powershell", "pwsh", "cmd.exe"]:
assert shell in BLOCKED_SHELLS, f"{shell} should be in BLOCKED_SHELLS"
def test_common_npm_scripts_allowed(self):
for script in ["dev", "start", "serve", "preview"]:
assert script in ALLOWED_NPM_SCRIPTS, f"{script} should be in ALLOWED_NPM_SCRIPTS"
def test_common_python_modules_allowed(self):
for mod in ["uvicorn", "flask", "gunicorn"]:
assert mod in ALLOWED_PYTHON_MODULES, f"{mod} should be in ALLOWED_PYTHON_MODULES"
def test_common_runners_allowed(self):
for runner in ["npm", "pnpm", "yarn", "python", "python3", "uvicorn", "flask", "cargo", "go"]:
assert runner in ALLOWED_RUNNERS, f"{runner} should be in ALLOWED_RUNNERS"
if __name__ == "__main__":
pytest.main([__file__, "-v"])